The sports diplomacy conceptual basis comes from Joseph Nye, who theorized soft power as the capacity to mold other’s preferences through attraction, and not through coercion (Nye, 1990, 2004). Nye distanced this idea from hard power (economic penalties, military dominance) by claiming that the resources which constitute soft power vary from culture to political principles and legitimate foreign policies. Sport, in this sense, arose as an important and powerful instrument of soft power thanks to the universal attention it attracts, how it transcends languages, and its capability of causing positive emotional connections (Murray, 2012). Nye importantly differentiated the possession of soft power resources and their successful conversion into influence, which is a key distinction to this article’s argument. As advised by Gallarotti (2010), nations that just gather resources but lack conversion mechanisms might undergo what he coined as “power curse”: the illusion of influence.

On early literature works about sport, the diplomatic component was analyzed through specific cases such as boycotts in South Africa during the Apartheid (Booth, 1997, 2003; Nixon, 1992), ping-pong diplomacy between the U.S. and China (Griffin, 2014; Hong & Sun, 2000; Kobierecki, 2016; Wasserstrom, 2000), or the Olympics during the Cold War (Guttmann, 1988; Keys, 2012; Redihan, 2017; Rider, 2016), but lacked appropriate frameworks to analyze these cases systematically.

Contemporary texts have dealt with such gap by theorizing the methods through which the use of sport is converted into diplomatic results. As Murray’s definition claims, sports diplomacy consists of “the conscious, strategic and ongoing use of sport, sportspeople and sporting events by state and non-state actors to advance policy, trade, development, education, image, reputation, brand, and people-to-people links” (Murray, 2018). It clearly underlines the intentional character of sports diplomacy, meaning that it entails premediated action more than just incidental and random outcomes. Furthermore, it recognizes that not only the government plays a role in sports diplomacy, but also several other non-state actors such as sports federations, clubs, athletes, institutions, among others. Hence, sports diplomacy exists if actors consciously regard sport as a means to diplomatic ends.

This assumption generates challenges when analyzing nations that possess the sporting capital but do not use it deliberately, a pattern which Spain exemplifies. Despite having sporting capital comparable to countries that have created official sports diplomacy strategies, Spain is still absent from comparative literature on sports diplomacy (Postlethwaite et al., 2023), portraying not its practical irrelevance but rather the incapacity of current frameworks to conceive this pattern.

The latent sports diplomacy concept also directly addresses current debates about nation branding and strategic communication. Van Ham (2001) stated how nurturing a positive national image is key to modern statecraft, whereas Anholt’s (2007) competitive identity framework presupposes active leverage of nations’ sport and cultural assets to strategic external projection. Furthermore, Melissen (2005) and Cull (2008) insert sports diplomacy in wider scopes of public diplomacy frameworks, focused on national projection. In Spain’s case, this debate is extremely relevant, as a nation that owns emblematic and material resources of a powerful sports house (global franchises, elite athletes, top sporting culture) but has not deployed them into an institutionalized strategic communication or national branding strategy. Pulleiro Méndez (2024) pertinently demonstrates Spain’s challenge on sports diplomacy through three dimensions: national unity, economic development and international projection, emphasizing how the lack of coordination mechanisms is a strategic choice rather than just a governmental gap, and that it has direct implications on Spain’s international perception.

Literature about sports diplomacy has developed different types of categorizing the political use of sport, however they all share a mutual limitation which is that they presume active resource deployment. Murray and Pigman (2014) differentiate “sport as diplomacy” (sport replaces conventional diplomatic processes) and “sport in diplomacy” (sport adds value to traditional diplomacy). Furthermore, Murray (2018) projected four impactful types: traditional sports diplomacy (the use of sport for specific multilateral goals by the government), new sports diplomacy (mega-sporting events used to reach nation-branding goals), sports as diplomacy (involvement of non-state actors) and sports anti-diplomacy (challenging political and diplomatic patterns through the use of sport).

In addition, Kobierecki (2020) expands Murray’s framework and uses a three-dimensional analysis: modeling bilateral relations, displaying the diplomatic character of sports institutions and building an international image. However, and despite being analytically relevant, these frameworks pay attention solely to the efficacy of conversion mechanisms rather than exploring if nations make use of their sporting capital or not. Grix et al. analyze various strategies across nations such as Germany, Qatar, United Kingdom and Brazil, establishing differences in implementation but still focusing on countries that intentionally make efforts to deploy sporting capital (Grix, 2012; Grix & Houlihan, 2014; Grix & Brannagan, 2016).

Such gap is intensified on literature about nation branding and the assumption present in it: Both Anholt (2007) and Van Ham (2001) assume that countries owning powerful cultural or sports resources will aim to operate strategically in terms of international image. Spain’s situation shows how this is not certain. The main countries that were analyzed through these frameworks demonstrate different institutional characteristics through which sports resources are actively (and strategically) employed. Nations that have official and governmental action in sports diplomacy include the United Kingdom, an example of coordination in this field through UK Sport, an agency created under the British government to promote sport and including an international relations section to “ensure the UK remains world-leading by using […] expertise and influence to shape the future of performance sport on the world stage” (UK Sport, n.d.).

Furthermore, UK Sport aims to use the power of sport to promote the United Kingdom internationally, coordinated with various governmental departments and offices (Culture, Media, Foreign Office) through clears protocols to achieve it. Similarly, France has long defined that sport highly contributes to ensuring the country’s international prestige being a “matter of State” (Gomez, 2022). The French Government has developed multiple sports diplomacy initiatives such as the French National Olympic and Sports Committee (CNOSF) and more recently French Sports Touch, both working together alongside other stakeholders to carry out an ambitious vision for French sport to grow and improve the country’s international impact (Comité National Olympique et Sportif Français, n.d.).

Qatar exemplifies a non-European nation which, despite its controversial elements, frames sport as a central pillar and “a powerful communications tool that can support international efforts to strengthen and renew diplomatic relations in times of crisis” (Jewell, 2022) through its National Vision 2030 document. Beyond official strategies, some countries show coordinated efforts in sports diplomacy without specific strategies such as Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) collaborating with different ministries, foundations and other nations to improve Germany’s international profile (documented in BMI’s official page and the national Agenda 2030).

The distinctive element on these cases is not only the magnitude of sporting capital, but the institutional architecture developed to deploy these resources. Current frameworks and their binary logic don’t describe nations which own significant sporting capital but lack the coordination mechanisms to use it in a strategically, a gap that this article tackles.

Such binary logic represents an analytical gap, and instances where sporting capital is present yet with no strategic use receive barely any attention. The research based on the Spanish case embodies this analytical gap. Current literature focuses on sport’s role in autonomous communities and separationist politics (Basque Country and Catalunya, for example) (De-San-Eugenio et al., 2017; García, 2012; Ginesta et al., 2024; Johnson, 2011; Pulleiro Méndez, 2022; Rojo-Labaien, 2017; Zákravský, 2016), specific periods like Francoism (Dichter, 2020; Simón, 2024; Simón & Rieck, 2022; Valiente, 2025), the Spain-Kosovo naming conflict (González de la Fuente & Gutiérrez Chico, 2021; Guttiérez-Chico & Pulleiro Méndez, 2023), and major events such as the Barcelona 1992 Olympics (Ginesta et al., 2024). The paradox of sports resources-strategic disconnection is still understudied. In Table 1, main systematic frameworks for sports diplomacy analysis are synthesized as well as their focus, resource deployment assumption and limitations concerning non-deployment of sporting capital. Together, these frameworks confirm that the lack of resource deployment is still outside the scope of current analytical frameworks, a gap that Spanish scholars has started to be documented (addressed in the “Scholarship of Sports Diplomacy in Spain” sub-section).

Table 1. Table 1. Main Sports Diplomacy Analysis Frameworks Source: Own elaboration.

Spanish institutional consciousness sparked in 2019 through Calatayud Soriano’s report, “La Diplomacia Deportiva como actor de la España global”, the first official examination of Spain’s sport ecosystem on a sports diplomacy perspective and the proposal of a model for the country in this field. As a governmental document published in a partnership with the MAEC and the CSD, it frames Spain’s sporting capital and potential for international expansion while identifying fragmentation on Spanish sports ecosystem that does not allow it to be used for this purpose. Furthermore, Calatayud Soriano proposes a multi-phased transformation strategy which entails coordination across institutions, consistent objectives and stable structures; however, five years later these projected solutions are still not implemented. Writing about the topic on the same year, Fernández Peña (2019) agrees Spain’s foreign policy has in its sport a valuable tool for projection, and that it needs to adopt a “polyhedral, complex and interconnected” approach to actors of the sport ecosystem.

Recent scholarship on Spain’s sports diplomacy confirms this fragmentation and offers a highly valuable framing of the pattern, laying the foundation for further theoretical development. Pérez-González (2022) provides an institutional drawing on a comparative analysis of sports diplomacy across European Union member-states (TES-D), confirming that Spain is institutionally fragmented (CSD, MAEC, AECID, Cervantes Institute) and lacks an official strategy for sports diplomacy, which multiple European states have.

Furthermore, Pulleiro Méndez (2024) provides a thorough complementary investigation on Spain’s sports diplomacy through three perspectives: Kosovo’s sports recognition and the diplomatic challenges it posed to Spain (also thoroughly assessed by González de la Fuente and Gutiérrez-Chico in 2021), performance metrics (WRCES ranking and Olympic medals), and event hosting capacity (unsuccessful Olympic bids and 2030 World Cup hosting). The material provided by the author evidences the governmental coordination that can happen when certain crises require so (protocols between the MAEC, CSD and RFEF attained diplomatic goals), while also examining initiatives – Working Group CSD and España Global, Fundación España Deporte Global – which demonstrate awareness yet lack long-term transformation. At the same time, these works demonstrate Spain’s paradox: significant sporting capital, proven capacity to coordinate institutions at need, but deficiency on the proactive deployment of this capital (all authors reaffirm the lack of an official governmental strategy). Expanding on their empirical work, this article theorizes the pattern and introduces latent sports diplomacy as a concept, providing the first framework that allows its identification on different national contexts. In section 2.5, this input is positioned within a wider theoretical scope.

The three-dimensional framework, which I am a co-author of (Costa & Moriconi, 2024), addresses these limitations across three scopes: practices, actors and objectives. It allows investigation on countries where the political use of sport is present but without clear objectives, where numerous actors operate yet lack coordination, or objectives are present but short of parallel practices. This flexibility is key to analyze Spain, where data suggests that practices are carried out by various actors but in the absence of coordination concerning diplomatic objectives.

Additionally, this framework addresses Postlethwaite et al. (2023) systematic review, pinpointing various theoretical inconsistencies. Reviewing more than 220 peer-reviewed academic works, it was observed that sports diplomacy literature entails conceptual vagueness, as scholars often employ terms inconsistently and are short of strong operational definitions (Costa & Moriconi, 2024). The three-dimensional framework offers clarification by providing explicit analytical categories, which can be applied systematically throughout different countries and contexts with no presumption of organizational patterns.

As mentioned previously, this literature review makes it possible to identify a conceptual gap in current sports diplomacy analysis: existing frameworks catalog different formulas to the use of sport for diplomatic outcomes, yet do not offer tools to explore nations that have sporting capital but no institutionalization. Therefore, based on the practice-actor-objective approach, this article introduces the concept of latent sports diplomacy to fill this gap, outlined through three main characteristics:

(1) Sporting capital defined by a powerful sport performance (success in different sports, international competitions, Olympic success) and/or resources equivalent to nations that actively pursue sports diplomacy (through an official national strategy or coordinated efforts across multiple institutions). This capital entails economic power of professional sports leagues, sports ambassadors recognized internationally, elite-level sports infrastructure, training systems and hosting of international sport events.

Latent sports diplomacy contrasts with Murray’s (2018) typology mainly on the intentionality of the concepts. Murray’s categories (traditional, new, sports-as, and anti-diplomacy) assume that sport as intentionally used as a diplomatic tool. Latent sports diplomacy, however, portrays the systematic absence of capital conversion, as the resources exist, the potentially diplomatic practices as well, yet no institutional architecture to coordinate them. Likewise, it is different from cases of nations that do not own those resources as they cannot chase sports diplomacy goals, whereas in latent pattern the resources are there but not institutionalized. This element is what lacks in current frameworks’ scope, and what latent sports diplomacy makes possible to analyze.

Latent sports diplomacy therefore broadens the typology developed by Murray further than the active use of sport categorization and operationalizes the three-dimensional framework (Costa & Moriconi, 2024). Through this conceptualization of patterns that prove to be latent, it allows the exploration of why particular countries mature institutionalization mechanisms to deploy sporting capital whereas other countries (regardless of having equivalent or at least comparable resources, as well as their value recognized by the government) don’t.

This section defined current frameworks for sports diplomacy analysis and their theoretical gaps, while introducing the concept of latent sports diplomacy as filling that gap. The next section operationalizes latent sports diplomacy through empirical indicators before describing the methodology used to apply it to Spain as a relevant case study.

Empirical classification of latent sports diplomacy entails an evaluation within three different dimensions, consistent with Costa and Moriconi’s three-dimensional framework (practice, actors and objectives).

First, sporting capital is evaluated through six fields: (1) competitive success (world championships, Olympic medals, constant presence in international competitions); (2) economic power (revenues of professional sports leagues, franchise valuations and sports industry economic impact); (3) international reach (world-wide ambassadors); (4) elite-level infrastructure (training centers, facilities development systems for young athletes); (5) human capital (coaching knowhow, sports management professionals and athlete development structures); and (6) event-hosting (capacity of organizing international sports events).

This assessment acknowledges the sports performance while the focus of equivalent statements lays on the dimensions where there is a similarity of resources when comparing to nations that actively pursue sports diplomacy. For example, an equivalence on professional sports league revenues and documented experience in hosting mega-events exemplifies substantial sporting capital even though factors such as the number of Olympic medals is noticeably smaller than those nations.

Second, an analysis on the practices and actors involved determines if sports-related practices with potential for diplomatic impact exist (international events, socio-cultural interactions based on sport, international engagement of athletes and federations) and identifies the actors that are involved in those practices.

Third, examining coordination explores the existence (or lack) of institutional mechanisms: (1) strategic documentation specifically about managing sports diplomacy goals; (2) committees for coordination across ministries on sport and foreign policy; (3) specific budget allocations for sports diplomacy; (4) frameworks for the diplomatic responsibilities/roles of actors of the sports world.

Latent sports diplomacy patterns arise when nations have access to sporting capital (first indicator), operate actions with diplomatic potential and different actors involved (second indicator), but are systematically defined by a lack of mechanisms for coordination (third indicator). While active sports diplomacy patterns have all these three indicators (with coordination) and absent ones lack sporting capital, the latent pattern enables the recognition of cases like Spain but also others beyond it, as it is applicable on different national backgrounds and preserves the analytical consistency required for comparative investigation.

With the definition of latent sports diplomacy clear, also its difference from existing frameworks, and empirical operationalization, section 3 outlines what methodology was applied to assess Spain’s pattern during 1992-2025, through the evaluation of sporting capital, coordination mechanisms and institutional architecture.

This article uses a research design with a qualitative case study character (Yin, 2018), assessing Spain’s sporting capital and sports diplomacy efforts throughout the period of 1992-2025. Spain embodies Gerring’s (2007) description of a key case study, being theoretically relevant due to its challenging and expanding character regarding current frameworks. The combination of powerful sporting capital, proven governmental awareness and constant absence of resource deployment is not rationalized through any of the sports diplomacy frameworks therefore turning Spain into a pivotal case study.

In the logic of comparative case study, Spain’s case is a “deviant case”, as defined by Seawright and Gerring (2008): a case with a result (absence of strategy for sports diplomacy) that differs from what its predictor values (significant resources) would be expected through current analytical frameworks. These cases are key for theory building due to the challenge of assumptions and arising of innovative conceptual typologies.

Documentary analysis: Spanish governmental documents (n=30) were chosen by purposive sampling across 1992-2025, guaranteeing the analysis of main institutional actors and developments in policy. Documents were selected on six areas: (1) legal – Real Decreto 2258/1977, Ley 10/1990, Ley 39/2022; (2) strategic planning – CSD yearly budgets (2018-2023), Modelo Del Deporte 2024, COE documents; (3) diplomatic action – Calatayud Soriano’s Report (2019), MAEC Kosovo Strategy (2018-2022), Foreign Action Strategy 2021-2024; (4) institutional initiatives – Fundación España Deporte Global (2020), Working Group CSD & España Global (2019); (5) club and federations – Real Madrid, FC Barcelona and LaLiga materials; RFEF Kosovo protocol (2021-2022); (6) comparative documentation – United Kingdom, Australia, France and Germany materials on sports diplomacy.

Expert interviews: Five experts were interviewed with a semi-structured approach to complement documental analysis. Semi-structured interviews were chosen and considered the most suitable design to convey this sort of institutional interviews. On one side, semi-structured format allows flexibility to delve into various scopes of complex institutional aspects but maintains a reliable structure of themes with all the participants. This balance is a characteristic that, most of the times, rigid interviews do not reach (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). On the other side, in an article like this where the institutional procedures and mechanisms lack documentation through official sources, semi-structured interviews allow participants to provide extremely relevant experience and knowledge on the topic.

The interview participants were selected based on their professional experience on national sports institutions or academic expertise in the sports policy and sports diplomacy field, including: one past official from the CSD, two scholars with expertise in sports diplomacy and two diplomatic practitioners involved in projects within the public and cultural diplomacy scope. All participants were given a guarantee of anonymity due to the particularly sensitive and critique character of the topic, and interviews were conducted between March and December 2025, in Spanish, with a 10-25-minute duration. The sample amount is proper for this research where the interviews are a complementary element more than a primary one. The intention of the interviews is to provide context, validate and understand the patterns that were detected in the document analysis, and not to be an independent set of data. This structure matches Flyvbjerg’s (2006) stress on how qualitative research must prioritize depth of information above statistical representativeness.

Interview topics included questions about governmental actors within the Spanish sport ecosystem, inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, Kosovo-Spain conflict and how the government acted diplomatically, lack of following action after demonstrated coordination capacity, and suggestions for sports diplomacy practices in Spain.

Both the document and interview data were coded through deductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and through codes from Costa and Moriconi’s three-dimensional framework. Firstly, each document and transcript was analyzed and excerpts labelled to match the categories addressed. Secondly, the coded parts went through a revision that allowed the identification of constant patterns, gaps, and inconsistencies. Regarding the documents, official materials were annotated, whilst for interviews the notes taken during the interview were converted in organized summaries and coded through identical categories. Participants were informed that the interviews were not being recorded and note-taking served as the primary method of documentation.

These codes were mainly employed as to classify (1) sporting capital within six fields; (2) sports practices with diplomatic potential; (3) actors and institutional affiliations; and (4) coordination mechanisms or lack of them.

Triangulation between document corpus and interview data validated the findings (Denzin, 1978; Flick, 2018). When the interview data supported the patterns seen in the documents, such patterns are considered as confirmed. Where inconstancies are present, both viewpoints were described. This type of cross-source triangulation reinforces the relevance and legitimacy of the findings in this article.

Coding served to identify: (1) sporting capital across six fields (competitive performance, sports infrastructure, economic power, governance system, human capital and event-hosting capacity); (2) sports practices with diplomatic potential; (3) key institution’s main actors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spanish Agency for International Development and Cooperation, Higher Sports Council, Instituto Cervantes, federations and regional governance); and (4) coordination mechanisms (or lack of them) connecting sports and diplomatic bodies towards sports diplomacy goals.

The single-case design fits in this article due to its the theory-building purpose as a theory development study. As stated by Flyvbjerg (2006), single-case analysis enables a degree of theoretical relevancy that large-n research does not, as it provides the comprehensive tracing of causal mechanisms. Electing Spain as a key case study, in terms of developing a new concept, composes a methodological strength rather than a limitation.

The qualitative research design gives precedence to analytical depth more than statistical representativeness. Despite the document corpus containing approximately thirty texts and covering a wide period and multiple key institutions, it does not thoroughly represent the totality of the discourse on Spanish sports policy. Nonetheless, the analysis guarantees coverage of an extensive number of political contexts where the sports diplomacy topic could be manifested and referred to.

Interviewing five experts offers rich institutional points of view from sports management, diplomatic and academic spheres, although the anonymity of the participants can limit the assessment on their credibility. By depending on detailed notes and not on recordings of the interviews, more open and outspoken answers may arise, yet constrains the precise verbatim of opinions expressed by the participants (mitigated by prioritizing thorough note expansion and argument development following the interview).

The following section presents the findings, structurally based on Costa and Moriconi’s framework. Subsequently, , the sub-section on “Sporting Capital in the Absence of Coordination” demonstrates Spain’s sporting capital within six fields, and the sub-section on “Practices, Actors and Objectives” analyzes practices, actors and objectives, showing institutional fragmentation notwithstanding the presence of substantial capital.

Documentary analysis shows Spain’s latent sports diplomacy pattern. This findings section demonstrates it across three dimensions for analysis and operationalizing Costa and Moriconi’s (2024) framework. Spain has significant sporting capital: strong competitive performance on various sports, and equivalent resources to countries that actively work on sports diplomacy whether through economic power, international reach, elite-level infrastructure or event hosting capacity. However, the legislative analysis demonstrates that these resources are domestically focused. Secondly, multiple actors operate within sports practices with diplomatic potential but towards sectoral and not diplomatic goals. Finally, despite 45-year legislative progress (1977-2022), no institutional structures integrate these resources to Spain’s international projection. These three elements corroborate Spain’s latent pattern.

Document analysis and expert interviews complemented and allowed the identification of three causal mechanisms which are deeply connected and explain why this pattern remains present despite various opportunities for renovation. These are:

Institutional path dependency: a structural characteristic of Spanish sports governance system. CSD’s legislative basis (from 1977) defined an administrative root dedicated mainly to the development of national sports more than the international side of it, articulating the various parts of the country within the sports sphere more than acting strategically and with authority, as described by a former official from the institution. This dependency is specifically documented, as the sports law from 2022 (Ley 39/2022) copies the original elements of CSD’s base legislation despite Spanish sport having evolved greatly since then, whether in sporting success or proven capacity for coordination in the Kosovo case, alluding to a resistance towards diplomatic transformation.

The same interviewed official, as well as the sports diplomacy scholars, commented on how there are multiple elements of the sport ecosystem which haven’t changed since 1992, confirming the picture of institutional inertia. The 1992 Olympics in Barcelona embodied a crucial period where Spain could have moved towards the institutionalization of sports diplomacy by taking advantage of the Olympic visibility and momentum. However, the experts reiterated that the priorities during this time were developing the domestic character of Spanish sport, once more displaying the path dependency on which sporting capital (in this case event-hosting and sports success) failed to be converted.

These three mechanisms are connected and reinforce each other: the path dependency validates the domestic-oriented agendas, the reactive character does not allow a sustainable coordination ability, and governmental fragmentation generates diffuse authority structures without mechanisms to connect them.

The causal mechanisms emphasized above illustrate how current sports diplomacy typologies do not include Spain’s circumstances. Each main framework shares the logic explained earlier in the “Literature Review and Theoretical Framework” section: resources are either deployed or not. Latent sports diplomacy goes beyond this binary logic. The “latent” concept thus portrays this visible but unaccounted phenomenon, developing the sports diplomacy field by showing how resource owning proves to be scarce if not allied with institutional coordination mechanisms as well as clear practices, actors and objectives which allow the resources to be converted into diplomatic outcomes.

Latent sports diplomacy is distinguished by three main characteristics. The first is the disconnection between capital and coordination. The six sporting capital fields are present: competitive performance (4^th place WRCES ranking), elite infrastructure, economic power, governance systems, human capital, and event-hosting capacity. Yet, the mechanisms for converting these resources into diplomatic goals are absent.

This diverges from the approach of other nations that correlate their capital with coordination structures such as the UK (UK Sport), Germany (DOSB partnership with Federal Foreign Office) and France (Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordination with the Ministry of Sports). Spain’s disconnection from sports diplomacy demonstrates how being capable within sports is not sufficient to use sport as a means to diplomatic goals if no institutional architecture for that purpose is developed. Gallarotti’s (2010) notion of “the power curse” is suitable here, as Spain’s constantly increasing sporting capital with no conversion mechanisms generates the illusion of diplomatic potential deprived of realization.

Secondly, having demonstrated coordination capacity but keeping it underdeveloped also characterizes latent sports diplomacy. The political tension between Spain and Kosovo during 2020-2024 originated by a sport conflict which then got relieved through diplomatic efforts revealed that Spain has the ability to coordinate its main sports institutions – MAEC, CSD and RFEF – to achieve diplomatic outcomes, even in the cases that demand difficult inter-ministerial interaction. Nevertheless, this ability was reactively triggered and remains specifically allocated to crisis like this one, as it is not visible how the government might have learned from this situation and did not convert it into permanent mechanisms which would fit appropriately to future conflicts. This coordination with a temporary character differentiates latent sports diplomacy patterns from active ones where the coordination mechanisms are created and developed independently of specific situations that require them.

Thirdly, acknowledging the importance of sport and sports diplomacy but not acting to develop it embodies the political dimension of latent sports diplomacy. Calatayud Soriano’s report was published under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation (MAEC) and, being an extensive 154-page report aimed specifically at demonstrating why Spain needs a model for sports diplomacy development and how it could achieve it, represents the governmental recognition of the potential of sports diplomacy in the Spanish context. However, this report was given no further attention and remains unattended, meaning that Spain’s latent pattern is branded by governmental inertia.

The concept thus provides a theoretically relevant typology which expands the analysis of sports diplomacy, providing the capacity to examine why sports resources in some nations are not fully converted into diplomatic results, despite governmental awareness. Furthermore, it builds on nation branding literature and fills a gap: both Van Ham (2001) and Anholt (2007) make the assumption that nations with powerful cultural or sporting resources use them strategically to improve their international image. However, Spain’s circumstances show how this is not an inevitability but rather a choice molded by a reactive character, institutional path dependency, and institutional fragmentation.

The pattern presented so far is different from Spain’s peer nations within the European continent. Countries like the UK, Germany and France, which own sporting capital comparable to Spain’s, consistently develop institutional structures and mechanisms that enable action and active growth of their sports diplomacy efforts.

The United Kingdom uses its sporting resources into sports diplomacy through UK Sport International. This agency coordinates efforts with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, British Council, and Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, being allocated a budget that enables resource deployment and ministerial supervision (UK Sport, n.d.). Additionally, the “Sporting Future” strategy published in 2015 formalizes the importance given by the British Government to sport and how the country aims to achieve sports diplomacy goals and project the UK internationally through sport (GOV.UK, 2015). The legislative architecture in the UK therefore specifically includes sports diplomacy, a legal basis that is not present in Spain’s legislation.

Germany’s institutional structure also has German Olympic Sports Federation as one of its main actors despite not having a formalized national sports diplomacy strategy, partnering with the Federal Foreign Office through the “Sport-for-development” program, which articulates development and diplomatic efforts. The German government has built a sports portfolio that contains partnerships with more than 40 countries during the last decade and keeps in its priorities using sports to achieve development goals (Brun, 2022). In a legislative perspective, German legislation recognizes sports diplomacy’s importance and provides the legal foundation for its development. Despite being territorially organized in Federal States, when comparing to Spanish autonomous communities it is worth noting that this decentralized system indeed makes coordination between actors highly challenging but does not stop the German government from working towards sports diplomacy long-term goals.

France also works actively on the sports diplomacy field. Despite in the past having had a national strategy created but not formalized, the French Ministry of Sports and Ministry of Foreign Affairs partnered in 2013 to develop a post dedicated to sports diplomacy, attached to Quai d’Orsay (Gomez, 2022). Furthermore, the French government has made sport a priority and a “matter of State”, actively engaging in multiple goals of sports diplomacy such as improving France’s attractiveness as a host country for international sports events, supporting national sports organisms and agencies and promoting sport as a tool for health, gender equality and development (2022). Most of these are allied with “French Sport Touch”, a structure created by the Ministry of Sport in 2021 aimed at “unite to win” and coordinating various institutional actors like the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, French Paralympic and Sports Committee and French National Olympic and Sports Committee (Comité National Olympique et Sportif Français, n.d.)

If we take these three nations as examples of active sports diplomacy action, Spain’s opposing pattern exists despite having comparable (and greater in some dimensions) sporting capital, demonstrating that the resources themselves do not determine progress on sports diplomacy. The institutional choices made by the Spanish government throughout key periods in the last four decades – post-Olympics (1992), Spanish football golden era (2008-2012), post-Calatayud Soriano’s report (2019) – reveal a prioritization of domestic growth, a generation of path-dependency and underdevelopment in comparison to European peers. It also indicates that political will and governmental prioritization drive the latent sports diplomacy pattern.

A comparison of turning points between these nations is useful for this article. London 2012 was leveraged by the United Kingdom to establish and strengthen a framework of coordination which was maturing since the 1990s. Likewise, the 2006 World Cup served as a key event for Germany’s nation-branding strategy, with long-term institutional benefits. France also used the bid for hosting the Paris 2024 Olympics as part of a coordinated expansion of sports diplomacy efforts.

Spain’s Barcelona 1992 Olympics boosted the country and city, as well as the country’s supremacy in international football during 2008-2012, alongside Calatayud Soriano’s 2019 sports diplomacy report. Each of the circumstances described in Spain produced minimal institutional improvement and therefore implies that Spain’s latent pattern reflects an institutional choice for domestic investment in sports rather than its international diplomatic usage, a preference that gains importance as Spain approaches the hosting of the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Furthermore, the comparison demonstrates two analytical elements on which Spain deviates, the first one being institutional design: the United Kingdom, France and Germany created specific structures (UK Sport International, Quai d’Orsay sports attaché, BMI-Federal Foreign Office) aimed at generating consistent association channels between sports governance bodies and foreign policy, something that Spain lacks. The CSD and MAEC work under different ministries and do not follow specific coordination agendas, a gap in Spanish sport architecture that has not been bridged by working groups or foundations. Secondly, major periods: all the compared nations leveraged the hosting of a major sports or diplomatic event into institutional improvement.

This article provides value to sports diplomacy theory through the operationalization of latent sports diplomacy, tackling a gap in existing frameworks that are not able to analyze nations that have sporting capital but fail to use it diplomatically. The framework developed by Costa and Moriconi (2024) based on practices, actors and objectives provided the outline for the identification of the latent sports diplomacy pattern. Furthermore, it allows this analysis to be applied in nations that exhibit a similar pattern. Contenders for future analysis include Portugal, Brazil or Italy, all nations that own significant sports resources but also lack documented strategic coordination.

Empirically, documenting Spain’s sporting capital and latent pattern also develops on current literature about Spanish sports diplomacy, not only documenting the institutional fragmentation and resources but further theorizing how resources alone do not convert into sports diplomacy. The expert interviews offered extremely valuable insights and causal interpretation that would not be possible just via document analysis. On a practical perspective, identifying the causal mechanisms implies suggestions for points of intervention. Being one of the co-hosts of the FIFA World Cup in 2030 presents itself as a critical opportunity that will require multiple coordination mechanisms between the co-host nations. Historical examples from Germany (2006) and France (2024) imply that major sports events can be used as inflection points in institutional improvements, as long as political leaders are committed to that.

To sum up, this article provides an original analytical category alongside its empirical validity, and practical recommendations based on comparative evidence, filling a gap in the current scholarship on sports diplomacy, nation branding, and soft power. The intervention could be carried out through legislative adjustments that feature international coordination, a committee with allocated budget and staff to foster inter-ministerial coordination, and a formalized national strategy for sports diplomacy in line with Foreign Action Strategy 2025-2028.

The single-case research design offers analytical depth but restricts generalizability. As the methodology section stated (following Flyvbjerg’s 2006 research), it is a fitting research design for theory-building yet further investigation on more nations like Portugal and Italy would enrich the applicability of this article. Moreover, both the document corpus and the interview participants gave priority to the governmental perspective, thus potentially not fully representing non-state actors’ point of view. Future studies that include athletes, sports federations and non-state sports agencies could provide valuable insight about Spain’s sport and coordination ecosystem. Moreover, the timeframe of this study does not allow the assessment of the FIFA 2030 World Cup, which can be a trigger for further awareness and action, and thus future research about the impact of co- hosting this mega-event for Spain’s sports diplomacy would demonstrate if the latent pattern persists.