Publicado May 30, 2017


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Edinson Cornejo-Saavedra

Paz Arias-Muñoz

Luis Améstica-Rivas

Nataly Guiñez-Cabrera



Las prácticas de earnings management ocurren cuando una firma usa la discrecionalidad en la elaboración de sus estados financieros y en la estructuración de sus transacciones, para alterar los beneficios reportados e inducir a error a los agentes interesados en el desempeño de la compañía; el fraude contable es la forma extrema de este tipo de prácticas. Este estudio analizó los efectos de una práctica extrema de earnings management —la repactación unilateral de créditos morosos— en los estados financieros e indicadores de desempeño de La Polar; y evaluó el efecto de la revelación de tales prácticas en los retornos accionarios de la firma y del sector retail de Chile. Se concluyó que la contabilidad de repactaciones mejoró la apariencia de los estados financieros y los indicadores de la firma; y que, una vez revelada esta situación, el mercado castigó el precio de las acciones de La Polar y también de las otras compañías de retail, ante las sospechas de que estas también realizaran repactaciones no reveladas en sus estados financieros.


Earnings management, provisões por incobráveis, repactuações unilaterais, fraude, retail.Earnings management, provisiones por incobrables, repactaciones unilaterales, fraude, retail.Earnings management, provisions for uncollectible debts, unilateral renegotiations, fraud, retail.

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Cómo citar
Cornejo-Saavedra, E., Arias-Muñoz, P., Améstica-Rivas, L., & Guiñez-Cabrera, N. (2017). Prácticas de earning management en el sector retail de Chile. El caso La Polar. Cuadernos De Contabilidad, 18(45).