Palavras-chave
contabilidade de gestão
conflitos de agência
tomada de decisões com critérios múltiplos
processo analítico hierárquico
Como Citar
Resumo
Este trabalho tem por objetivo descobrir as alternativas prioritárias que intervêm nos processos de tomada de decisão para reduzir os problemas da agência tendo em conta os critérios de Governança Corporativa (CG) e Contabilidade Gerencial (MA). Usando a metodologia de Tomada de Decisão Multicritério (MCDM), é possível modelar a estrutura hierárquica para determinar a classificação das prioridades de decisão usando o método do Processo Analítico Hierárquico (AHP). CG e MA são os principais critérios de tomada de decisão para reduzir os problemas entre propriedade e controle de capital. Assim, o envolvimento dos agentes é a primeira alternativa para reduzir os conflitos da agência considerando uma abordagem geral. A rendição de contas estratégica deve ser uma prioridade para reduzir os problemas da agência centrando-se no CG e a confiança é a principal variável a ser considerada do ponto de vista do MA. A pesquisa fornece um sistema multicritério para reduzir os problemas da agência na tomada de decisões. Este trabalho contribui para a minimização da assimetria de informação e tem implicações para a preservação e criação de valor para as partes interessadas. A estrutura de decisão e as alternativas relacionadas à CG e MA têm aplicações práticas diretas para gerentes e partes interessadas envolvidas nas decisões empresariais para reduzir os conflitos da agência. Este artigo apresenta evidências da importância das variáveis de CG e MA na redução da assimetria de informação e problemas de agência, e estabelece as principais prioridades em um contexto de tomada de decisão para os gerentes.
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