Ciccarelli and Beckman found in their 2005 review of assisted reproductive technologies that those involving third parties (including surrogates) were less acceptable than all others, especially if they were remunerated. In subsequent studies, the rate of approval considerably varied according to the country. It was high in Iran, where Shiite scholars publicly supported it: It was approved by 90% of infertile women living in Tabriz (Rahmani et al., 2011) and by 53% of female and 55% of male members of infertile couples in Hamadan (Mohebbi Kian, Riazi, & Bashirian, 2014). Also, in a study conducted among fertile women in East Azerbaijan, 82% of them considered that surrogacy should be legal, while only 3% declared that surrogacy causes ethical problems for society, and only 7% viewed payment of surrogate mothers as distasteful (Rahmani et al., 2014).

In contrast, in Ibadan, Nigeria, only 38% of a sample of infertile women would agree to surrogacy, and most of these opposed paying the surrogate (Bello, Akinajo, & Olayemi, 2014). Moreover, in Ankara, Turkey, only 15% (Baykal, Korkmaz, Ceyhan, Goktolga, & Baser, 2008) of infertile women would agree to surrogacy and only 24% (Kilic et al., 2009) had positive attitudes toward it. In addition, in Japan, among infertile couples, only 17% of women and 23% of men would have recourse to gestational surrogacy and only 7% and 8%, respectively, to traditional surrogacy (Saito & Matsuo, 2009), although 50% of a general sample of adults, especially those expressing a liberal attitude toward gender roles, approved gestational surrogacy (Suzuki et al., 2006).

The present study was exploratory. It was aimed to map young Indians’ views regarding the acceptability of surrogacy and to delineate the circumstances under which surrogacy is considered especially problematic. The sample was composed of students because, before launching a full scale study on this very sensitive issue -- a study involving large samples of adults, it was considered necessary to explore its feasibility in terms of people’s reactions and willingness to participate.

Owing to current legislation, the study was restricted to the case in which an Indian couple of commissioners have contracted with an Indian surrogate mother. The study was motivated by the fact that, as illustrated above, (a) legislation regarding surrogacy is very disparate from country to country, (b) people’s opinions regarding its acceptability seem to vary as a function of the type of surrogacy and the surrogate mother’s characteristics, and (c) no study to date has explored Indians’ views on this issue although the issue has been much debated in the country.

The present study used the same technique as the one implemented in France by Petitfils et al. (2017). In this study, participants were presented with a number of realistic scenarios depicting the circumstances in which an infertile couple has contracted with a surrogate mother, and they were requested to assess the extent to which such a contract would be morally problematic. Four factors were considered: (a) type of surrogacy (fertilization by sperm or by transfer of an embryo), (b) surrogate mother’s level of autonomy (e.g., has a job and fully understands the process), (c) surrogate mother’s family situation (e.g., single without a child), and (d) level of compensation associated with identity of the surrogate (e.g., payment of €5000 to a cousin). Through cluster analysis, three qualitatively different personal positions were found: (a) a minority group (14%) for which maternal surrogacy does not systematically present a moral problem, (b) a majority group for which surrogacy often (34%) or always (30%) presents a moral problem, (b) and (c) a group (22%) for which circumstances – mainly the family context and the mother’s level of autonomy were completely determining.

It was not necessary to alter the scenarios created by Petitfils et al. (2017) because the four factors listed above perfectly fit the main considerations expressed in the report on assisted reproductive technology issued by the Law Commission of India (2009), namely (a) whether the surrogate mother has the capability to express consent to bear a child to full term, (b) whether gestational or traditional surrogacy is under consideration, (c) whether the surrogate mother’s husband agrees with the procedure (or the mother is still single), and (d) the extent to which the expenses for carrying are compensated, and the mother has been paid.

We expected to find, in our sample of students, qualitatively different ethical positions. First, we expected to find, as in Petitfils et al. (2017): (a) a group of students for which maternal surrogacy always poses a moral problem and (b) a group of students for which maternal surrogacy never poses a big moral problem, irrespective of circumstances. Although the ‘always a problem’ position was the majority position in most studies conducted on samples of lay people from different countries (Ciccarelli & Beckman, 2005), we nevertheless expected, owing to the current situation in India, this group not to be the majority group.

Second, we expected to find, as in Petitfils et al. (2017) a group of students whose opinion is determined by the concrete circumstances of surrogacy. In this group, the more the person is autonomous (e.g., the person is able to fully understand the procedure and is not financially deprived), the more the gametes come from both intended parents, and the more the family context is favorable (the surrogate mother’s husband does not object to the procedure), the less the recourse to maternal surrogacy would be viewed as a moral problem. We expected this group to be the majority group.

The mean acceptability ratings and standard deviations for each scenario are shown in Annex A. A cluster analysis was performed on the raw data using the procedure advocated by Hofmans and Mullet (2013, see also Sedkaoui & Mullet, 2016). Four clusters were identified. Two of them are shown in Figure 1. A set of four ANOVAs was performed on the data from each cluster with a design of Type x Autonomy x Family Status x Compensation, 2 x 3 x 3 x 3. Owing to the great number of comparisons (15), the significance threshold was, using the Bonferroni technique, set at 0.003 (0.05/15). The results of the ANOVA are shown in Annex B.

The first cluster (15% of the sample) was called Type of Surrogacy because this factor had by far the strongest effect. Ratings were considerably higher when sperm were used (M = 8.14) than when an embryo was transferred (M = 4). They were slightly higher (a) when the surrogate mother was not autonomous (M = 6.87) than when she was (M = 5.66 and 5.70), and (b) when the surrogate mother’s husband objected (M = 6.48) or she was single (M = 6.52) than when the surrogate husband did not object (M = 5.22). The Type x Autonomy interaction was significant. The autonomy effect was weaker when sperm were used (8.47 – 7.93 = 0.54) than when an embryo was transferred (5.26 – 3.36 = 1.90). The Type x Family Status interaction was significant (depicted in Figure 1, top panels). Three other interactions were also significant, although their effect sizes were weaker; detailed results are available from the corresponding author.

The second cluster (39%) was called Family Context because this factor had the strongest effect. Ratings were higher when the surrogate mother’s husband objected (M = 6.48) than when he did not (M = 3.87). Ratings were medium when the surrogate mother was single (M = 5.66). Ratings were also higher (a) when sperm were used (M = 5.78) than when an embryo was transferred (M = 4.90), and (b) when the surrogate mother was not autonomous (M = 6.11) than when she was (M = 4.93 and 4.97). The Type x Family interaction was significant. It is depicted in Figure 1 (bottom panels).

The third cluster (23%, not shown) was the expected Always a Big Moral Problem cluster because all ratings were high (M = 8.05). Ratings were still higher (a) when sperm were used (M = 8.46) than when an embryo was transferred (M = 7.65), (b) when the surrogate mother was not autonomous (M = 8.36) than when she was (M = 7.88 and 7.93), and (c) when the surrogate mother’s husband objected (M = 8.54) than in the other cases (M = 7.67 and 7.96). The Type x Family Status interaction was significant. The family effect was weaker when sperm was used (8.75 – 8.15 = 0.60) than when an embryo was transferred (8.33 – 7.18 = 1.15). The Autonomy x Family Status interaction was also significant. The family effect was weaker when the mother was not autonomous (8.63 – 8.13 = 0.50) than when she was (8.62 – 7.52 = 1.10).

Figure 1

Ratings are on the y-axis. Surrogate mother’s level autonomy is on the x-axis (E/U = Employed and understands the procedure, U/U = Unemployed and understands, U/D = Unemployed and doesn’t fully understand). The three curves express the surrogate mother’s family status. The two panels correspond to the two types of surrogacy. The two rows correspond to the Type of Surrogacy and Family Context clusters.

We have, as in Petitfils et al. (2017), found qualitatively different positions but these positions were not fully similar to the ones in the French study. In both studies, a group of participants for which maternal surrogacy always pose a big moral problem was identified. Nevertheless, this group was not, and as expected, the majority group (23% in the present study vs. 63% in Petitfils et al. (2017). This suggests that most young people in India are, as people in the neighboring country of Iran (Rahmani et al., 2014), not radically hostile to the procedure. Females were more frequently members of this group than males.

As expected, a group of participants (55%) for which surrogacy does not systematically pose a moral problem was found. This group was however split in two subgroups. For some of these participants (15%), mostly females, the major criterion of acceptability was the type of surrogacy (gestational or traditional). When both sets of gametes were from the intended parents, gestational surrogacy was not seen as posing a moral problem provided that the surrogate’s husband agreed with the procedure, and even when the surrogate mother was not fully able to understand it. When one set of gametes was from the surrogate mother (traditional surrogacy), however, surrogacy was always seen as posing a moral problem. This finding was consistent with the assertion in the report by the Law Commission of India (2009, p. 26) that “bond of love and affection with a child primarily emanates from biological relationship”. Females were more frequently members of this group than males; they may feel that it would be more difficult to relinquish one’s own biological child to strangers than a child with whom no genetic link exists.

For the remaining participants (40%), the criterion of acceptability was the family context, in association with the surrogate mother’s level of autonomy and the type of surrogacy. Each time the surrogate mother’s husband agreed with the procedure, surrogacy of both types were not viewed as posing a moral problem except when the surrogate mother was not fully able to understand the procedure.

A group of “undetermined” participants was also found, mostly males. Such a group of participants has been already found in a study on the issue of ending the lives of newborns conducted in India (Kamble, Ahmed, Sorum, & Mullet, 2014, see also Mullet et al., 2016). The fact that about one fifth of the sample chose not to express any opinion is somewhat surprising since, contrary to the issue of damaged newborns, the issue of maternal surrogacy has, in India, been debated for quite a while (Mukherjee, 2007). Many students may have felt that they were not directly concerned by the issue or may have felt that they were not informed enough.

This finding provides, however, an important methodological lesson: if, for example, only one scenario had been used – for example, of a single female able to understand the procedure of gestational surrogacy -- the responses of participants from the undetermined cluster and of those from the family context cluster would have been indistinguishable. Having participants respond to multiple, structured scenarios allowed us to distinguish the absence of opinion from medium support and to correctly classify people as a function of their opinions.

Several additional issues must be discussed. The first one is related to the weakness of the effect of the surrogate mother’s level of autonomy compared to the effects of the type of surrogacy and the family context. Although this result was fully consistent with previous findings from studies on ethical issues conducted in India (Kamble, Sorum, & Mullet,, 2012; Kamble et al., 2014), it raises the question of the relevance of the autonomy principle of bioethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 2008) in communitarian societies such as India (Crawford, 2003). The concern of some Indian physicians that far “from empowering a woman”, maternal surrogacy “represents loss of choice, loss of autonomy, loss of control” might be well grounded (Patel & Rao, 2014, p. 32).

The second issue is related to the weakness of the effect of the compensation factor, as compared with its effect among French. This finding is interesting in regards to the importance given to monetary compensation among Western politicians: In countries such as the United Kingdom or the state of New York, commercial surrogacy is clearly distinguished from altruistic surrogacy and completely prohibited. Among young Indians, and on the moral level, this distinction seems not to hold: Commercial surrogacy does not pose a greater problem than altruistic surrogacy. This finding is consistent with considerations that have been expressed in the Indian press by managers of IVF clinics: “Domestic “labour should be paid, so when reproduction and pregnancy becomes a job, we will look at the value of female labour in a new light. This would elevate women’s status in a patriarchal capitalist society” (Patel & Rao, 2014, p. 31).

The third issue is related to the strong effect of the field-of-studies variable on participants’ positions. This effect, which was largely unexpected, is difficult to interpret. It suggests that the strong individual differences that have been found in this study may be linked to participants’ personality and values. Indeed, career choice is not simply determined by general intelligence and good grades in sciences or in arts; it, logically, depends on personal interests (Athanasou & van Esbroeck, 2008). Life sciences students were, more often than others, found in the type of surrogacy cluster; perhaps these students, owing to their training in biology, tended more than others to give weight to physiological factors. Psychology students were, more often than others, found in the undetermined cluster; perhaps these students, owing to their training, were, more than others, torn between the two conflicting views expressed earlier: surrogacy as empowerment of women versus surrogacy as exploitation of the poor (Patel & Rao, 2014). Future studies should more closely link ethical views with personality and value measurements in order to more completely understand what can appear as starkly contrasting views about ethical issues.