It is commonly held that even though, in the period of Being and Time,  Heidegger was critical of the Greek conception of being as presence (Anwesenheit, Praesenz), he came to embrace the conception of being as presencing (Anwesen) in his later work. In the paper I argue that this view, even if true from a general viewpoint, requires major specification. I claim that the notion of Anwesen only came to express Heidegger’s own positive conception of being around the mid-forties and after a complex and relatively long process correlative, on the one hand, to the evolution of his use of the term ‘Wesen’, and to his reappropriation of the Presocratics, on the other. I present the details of this process and suggest that Heidegger’s relatively late decision to employ the term ‘Anwesen’ to express his own conception of being can be seen as part of his effort to reach a balance between several aspects of said conception.