A fundamental intention of Wittgenstein's early thought is to draw up limits to that which may be said with sense in language, in any language that represents the reality. When drawing up these limits Wittgenstein concludes, as a result of his criticism of language in a Kantian sense, that the logical conditions that are to be fulfilled by the language in order to represent reality are beyond such limits, that is to say, they are indescribable. Wittgenstein's later thought rejects the idea that the essential function of language is to represent reality. The language performs a wide diversity of functions; we give many different uses to it. The later Wittgenstein remarks that the significant uses of the language rest on very basic natural conditions. So the aim of this paper is to examine whether these natural conditions would be —and for similar reasons to those that the early Wittgenstein stated on the logical conditions mentioned before— beyond the limits of what is expressible and explicable or justifiable in such a variety language games as we use.