First, the pro-lije and pro-choice arguments are examined.The pro- lije extreme form, being therefore inacceptable or impracticable. Moderate pro- lije positions face the difficulty of determining normative criteria in order to identify in wich cases abortion is acceptable or not. The problem of the ontological status of the embryo or foetus poses the thoughest difficulty to the pro-choice position. The source of the polarization between the pro-lije and the pro-choice positions can thus be identified, since the pro-lije position reasoning is based upon values whereas the pro choice position reasoning is based upon rights. It is argued that an approach between these positions is only possible in the field of rights, since the absolute upholding of values closes the way to any possibility of dialogue. Woman's rights, are not absolute in respect to the foetus and cannot be founded merely on the will. A way out seems possible only if the interests of woman and foetus are both taken under consideration.