Published Jul 30, 2019



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Alessio Gava https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0426-8392

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Abstract

In their recent “A modest defense of manifestationalism” (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen’s argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature of scientific inquiry. In this paper, I will show that Asay and Bordner’s criticisms to Rosen are actually off target. Moreover, they rest upon an understanding of what the aim of science is that might serve to their purposes, but that does not seem to be in line with the scientific enterprise. Perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.

Keywords

Asay and Bordner, constructive empiricism, manifestationalism, Rosen, van FraassenAsay y Bordner, empirismo constructivo, manifestacionalismo, Rosen, van Fraassen

References
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How to Cite
Gava, A. (2019). A Modest Refutation of Manifestationalism. Universitas Philosophica, 36(73), 259–287. https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.uph36-73.mrom
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