Palabras clave
contabilidad gerencial
conflictos de agencia
toma de decisión multicriterio
proceso analítico jerárquico
Cómo citar
Resumen
Este trabajo tiene por objeto descubrir las alternativas prioritarias que intervienen en los procesos de toma de decisiones para reducir los problemas de agencia teniendo en cuenta los criterios de Gobernanza Corporativa (CG) y Contabilidad Gerencial (MA). Utilizando la metodología de Toma de Decisión Multicriterio (MCDM), es posible modelar la estructura jerárquica para determinar la clasificación de las prioridades de decisión utilizando el método del Proceso Analítico de Jerárquico (AHP). La CG y la MA son los principales criterios de toma de decisión para reducir los problemas entre la propiedad y el control del capital. Así pues, comprometer a los agentes es la primera alternativa para reducir los conflictos de agencia considerando un enfoque general. La rendición de cuentas estratégica debe ser una prioridad para reducir los problemas de agencia centrándose en la CG y la confianza es la principal variable para considerar desde el punto de vista de la MA. La investigación proporciona un sistema multicriterio para reducir los problemas de los organismos en la toma de decisiones. Este trabajo contribuye a la minimización de la asimetría de la información y tiene implicaciones en la preservación y creación de valor para las partes interesadas. La estructura decisoria y las alternativas relacionadas con la CG y la MA tienen aplicaciones prácticas directas para los gestores y los actores que participan en las decisiones empresariales para reducir los conflictos de agencia. Este artículo presenta pruebas de la importancia de las variables de CG y MA para reducir los problemas de asimetría de la información y de agencia, y establece las principales prioridades en un contexto de toma de decisiones para los gestores.
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