Keywords
right to information
insurance
incentives
How to Cite
Abstract
The insurance market in Mexico faces a risk problem caused by the adverse selection that exists in the insurance contracting process by clients to insurers, mainly due to the concealment of private information that is not shared with the institutions. In this research we model the results of the implementation of an information portfolio of the insured regarding his previous policies before the insurers that are in the process of calculating premiums. In addition, we consider that customers can exercise their right to information, so they may or may not allow said information to be accessed by the insurer. Our model suggests that the implementation of this type of measure can reduce the problem of adverse selection in the contracting process, reduce the number of insurance frauds, and reduce the risk in the Mexican insurance market.
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