Abstract
The article analyzes the requirements entailed by one of the desiderāta of the Rule of Law theorized by LON L. FULLER. This is the desiderātum of clarity. It is argued that clarity contains two distinct requirements: intelligibility and specificity. Both feature in Fuller's treatment of clarity, but they are not adequately distinguished. In particular, the idea of specificity is neither explained nor justified. It is the aim of this article to provide that explanation and justification, as well as to show their consequences. It holds that the consequences are both practical and theoretical. As to practical consequences, clarity as specificity sheds light on a potential deficiency in the creation and administration of rules in a legal system that is different from those entailed by other desiderāta: the vagueness, fewness, and lack of differentiation of legal norms. As to theoretical consequences, our analysis helps explain why the law has the specific quality of being a relatively intricate normative body, articulated by a set of more or less specific, multiple and differentiated rules. In this sense, the desiderātum of clarity as specificity has a strategic importance in Fuller's set of desiderāta.
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