Keywords
meaning
philosophy of language
mentalist theories of meaning
How to Cite
Abstract
This paper presents two criticisms to Professor Lukomski's paper on Quine's theory of meaning. In the first place, to identify Quine's attack on the Standard Thesis (ST) with his attack on the mentalism involved in the traditional conception of meaning is limiting the scope of Quine's critique. In the second place, one must not confuse —or at least one must try to separate very clearly— mentalistic theories of meaning and intensionalistic ones.This journal is registered under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License. Thus, this work may be reproduced, distributed, and publicly shared in digital format, as long as the names of the authors and Pontificia Universidad Javeriana are acknowledged. Others are allowed to quote, adapt, transform, auto-archive, republish, and create based on this material, for any purpose (even commercial ones), provided the authorship is duly acknowledged, a link to the original work is provided, and it is specified if changes have been made. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana does not hold the rights of published works and the authors are solely responsible for the contents of their works; they keep the moral, intellectual, privacy, and publicity rights.
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