Published Jun 30, 2014



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Francisco Vicente Galán Vélez

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze Lonergan’s criteria of truth, which is the absence of further pertinent questions. This position is compared with that defended by Habermas in his book Truth and Justification, in which he abandoned the consensual theory of truth, in order to adopt a truth called for him “pragmatic”. In both positions there is a distinction between factual judgments which could be made in the common sense realm of meaning, and in scientific propositions in which it is not possible to reach certainty.

Keywords

Lonergan, Habermas, truth, pragmatism, virtually unconditionedLonergan, Habermas, verdad, pragmatismo, virtualmente incondicionado

References
How to Cite
Galán Vélez, F. V. (2014). Pragmatic Truth and Consensual Truth in Habermas: A Lonerganean Reading. Universitas Philosophica, 31(62). https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.uph31-62.vpvc
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Articles