The aim of this paper is to present a critique of the conventionalist interpretation of the rule-following problem Saul Kripke holds in his book: Wittgenstein. On Rules and Private Language. To achieve this, we suggest a detailed reading of the paragraphs §§185-217 of Philosophical Investigations where it’s shown that there are cases when the meaning of the expressions “rule following” and “contravene” is not determined only by appealing to conventional criterion, as Kripke firmly declared. This interpretation allows us to state that while Wittgenstein accepts the importance of customs and institutions to correctly elaborate normative judgments, he also points the existence of a basic cross-conventional space –the human being space– which allows us to recognize normative attitudes happening in unconventional courses of action, and therefore, it becomes a support to emit normative meaningful judgments. As a result, and following our reading of §206 we are able to identify in the Wittgenstein’s rule-following statements that allow going from a purely conventionalist interpretation to an anthropological one.