Publicado Nov 21, 2011



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Heriberto García Núñez

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Resumen

Existe una tendencia mundial a reforzar la regulación de los mercados  financieros y de las empresas públicas, con miras a proteger los intereses del principal. Una manera de disminuir la exposición de los inversionistas es mejorar
las prácticas de gobierno corporativo en las empresas que utilizan recursos del
público. Este artículo analiza, a la luz de la teoría de la agencia, las siguientes
cuestiones. ¿Las mejores prácticas de gobierno corporativo protegen a los
inversionistas? ¿Existen diferencias en el corto y en el largo plazo? ¿La  regulación para mejorar el gobierno corporativo ayuda a mejorar la estructura de capital? En el comportamiento de corto y largo plazo del mercado financiero
mexicano parece influir la globalización, la información privilegiada y la convergencia entre las empresas nacionales y sus contrapartes extranjeras en
materia de riesgo y rendimiento.

Keywords

Regulamentação, investidores, risco, estrutura de capital.Regulación, inversionistas, riesgo, estructura de capitalRegulation, investors, risk, capital structure

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Cómo citar
García Núñez, H. (2011). La regulación y sus efectos en el desempeño y la estructura de capital. Evidencia del mercado financiero mexicano. Cuadernos De Administración, 24(42). https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.cao24-42.rede
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