Publicado Dec 16, 2021


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José E. Tobar Arias

Andres Mora Valencia

Esther B. Del Brío González



El propósito de este documento es doble: en primer lugar, se realiza un análisis del efecto directo de la estructura de propiedad y de los consejos de administración sobre el insider trading. En segundo lugar, examinamos el posible efecto moderador que tiene la concentración de la propiedad sobre el papel disciplinario de los consejos a la hora de prevenir esta práctica de mercado. Los resultados de la regresión múltiple y la regresión múltiple jerárquica muestran un efecto negativo tanto de la concentración de la propiedad como de la porción de directores independientes sobre el insider trading. En cuanto al efecto moderador, se evidencia que el rol de control de los consejos está influenciado por la concentración de propiedad.


Corporate governance, insider trading, ownership structureGobierno corporativo, insider trading, estructura de propiedadGovernança corporativa, insider trading, estrutura de propriedade

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Cómo citar
Tobar Arias, J. E., Mora Valencia, A., & Del Brío González, E. B. (2021). Gobierno corporativo e insider trading. La concentración de la propiedad como variable moderadora del rol de control de los consejos. Cuadernos De Administración, 34.
Edición regular