Publicado dic 1, 2012


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Gregorio Sánchez Marín

Antonio J. Carrasco Hernández

Sergio Manuel Madero Gómez



Este artículo examina la retribución de los empleados de base en empresas familiares

pertenecientes a dos regiones de España y México, a partir de las diferencias

culturales de ambos países, identificadas por Hofstede. Los resultados obtenidos

a partir de 342 empresas españolas y 280 mexicanas muestran que la retribución

varía entre tipos de empresa familiar y entre países. Tales diferencias se explican

tanto desde argumentos de agencia (composición de la dirección y de los intereses

compartidos por propietarios-empleados) como institucionales (condicionantes culturales).

En concreto, se encontró, por un lado, que la retribución de los empleados

de base en la empresa de propiedad y dirección familiar es inferior y tiene un carácter

más fijo que la de los empleados de la empresa familiar profesionalizada; por

el otro, que los empleados mexicanos tienen retribuciones inferiores que las de los

españoles, aunque reciben mayores porcentajes de retribución variable.


family business employee remuneration, theoretical agency and institutional frameworks, Spanish and Mexican businesses, remuneration in family-owned and family-managed businesses, Mexican employees remuneration and Spanish employees remunerationretribuição de empregados na empresa familiar, entorno teórico de agência e institucional, empresas espanholas e mexicanas, retribuição em empresas de propriedade e direção familiar, retribuição empregados mexicanos e espanhóisretribución de empleados en empresa familiar, marcos teóricos de agencia e institucional, empresas españolas y mexicanas, retribución en empresas de propiedad y dirección familiar, retribución empleados mexicanos y españoles

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Cómo citar
Sánchez Marín, G., Carrasco Hernández, A. J., & Madero Gómez, S. M. (2012). Retribución de los empleados en la empresa familiar: un análisis comparativo regional España-México. Cuadernos De Administración, 23(41).