Published May 15, 2010



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Rafael Nieto Navia

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Abstract

The article refers to the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, in which Serbia
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY) was accused of having committed
genocide through troops of the Republic Srpska in Srebrenica. It considers the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
the meaning of “total or partial destruction of a group”, and if those troops
could be considered de jure or de facto organs of the FRY, a basic definition
for attributing responsibility to it. The purpose is to point out to the differences
between the jurisprudences of the International Court of Justice and
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and to
conclude that the international judicial organs cannot attribute responsibility
to a State if the acts were committed by persons or groups which are not de
jure or de facto organs of the State.

Keywords

Genocide, Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Court of Justice, group, de jure or de facto organsGenocidio, Srebrenica (Bosnia Herzegovina), Tribunal Penal para la antigua Yugoslavia, Corte Internacional de Justicia, grupo, órganos de jure y de facto

References
How to Cite
Nieto Navia, R. (2010). INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN CASES OF GENOCIDE, THE DECISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE CASE OF SREBRENICA. International Law: Revista Colombiana De Derecho Internacional, 8(16). Retrieved from https://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/internationallaw/article/view/13832
Section
Articles