Keywords
paradigmatism
separation
nominalism
realism
How to Cite
Abstract
This article re-examines Plato’s contribution to the contemporary problem of universals, challenging the dichotomy between transcendent universals and Aristotelian immanence. Although nominalist approaches struggle to explain the identity necessary for scientific practice, realist theories remain divided between Aristotelian and Platonic perspectives. It is argued that the rejection of Platonism stems from a misinterpretation of the separation of universals from sensible particulars, which does not imply irrelevance. Drawing on a critique of Gail Fine’s interpretation, it is established that the independent existence of the Forms does not explain their relationship to sensible particulars. It is proposed that Platonic Forms can be viewed as both independent and explanatory through a form of non-reductive immanence. Thus, it is concluded that Platonism remains a valid explanation of universals, maintaining the intelligibility of particulars and the objectivity of knowledge.
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