Reducing Values Scales
Published
Jun 30, 2023
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J.-Martín Castro-Manzano
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2227-921X
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2227-921X
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Abstract
A values scale can be defined by two components: a set of values and an order relation. These two components help explain some popular opinions about values scales that favor some sort of axiological relativism. In this contribution we offer a reduction strategy that allows us to accept the presence of said components without necessarily implying an axiological relativism.
Keywords
axiology, reduction, values, relativism, pluralismaxiología, reducción, valores, relativismo, pluralismo
References
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Caleiro, C., Carnielli, W., Coniglio, M., y Marcos, J. (2005). Two’s Company: “The Humbug of Many Logical Values”. En J.-Y. Béziau (Ed.), Logica Universalis (pp. 169-189) Birkhäuser Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7643-7304-0_10
Chemla, E. y Égré, P. (2019). Suszko’s Problem: Mixed Consequence and Compositionality. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 12(4), 736-767. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1707.08017
Jarvie, I. C. (1983). Rationality and Relativism. The British Journal of Sociology, 34(1), 44-60.
Łukasiewicz J. (1920). O logice trójwartościowe. Ruch filozoficzny, 5, 170-171.
Malinowski, G. (1994). Inferential Many-Valuedness. En J. Wolenski (Ed.), Philosophical Logic in Poland (pp. 75-84). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. Free Press.
Scheler, M. (1973). Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, M. Frings y R. Funk (Trads.). Northwestern University Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are There Universal Aspects in the Content and Structure of Values? Journal of Social Issues, 50(4), 19-45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x
Suszko, R. (1977). The Fregean Axiom and Polish Mathematical Logic in the 1920s. Studia Logica, 36(4), 373-380.
Velleman, J. D. (2013). Foundations for Moral Relativism. Open Book Publishers.
Wójcicki, R. (1970). Some Remarks on the Consequence Operation in Sentential Logics. Fundamenta Mathematicae, 68(3), 269-279.
Caleiro, C., Carnielli, W., Coniglio, M., y Marcos, J. (2005). Two’s Company: “The Humbug of Many Logical Values”. En J.-Y. Béziau (Ed.), Logica Universalis (pp. 169-189) Birkhäuser Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7643-7304-0_10
Chemla, E. y Égré, P. (2019). Suszko’s Problem: Mixed Consequence and Compositionality. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 12(4), 736-767. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1707.08017
Jarvie, I. C. (1983). Rationality and Relativism. The British Journal of Sociology, 34(1), 44-60.
Łukasiewicz J. (1920). O logice trójwartościowe. Ruch filozoficzny, 5, 170-171.
Malinowski, G. (1994). Inferential Many-Valuedness. En J. Wolenski (Ed.), Philosophical Logic in Poland (pp. 75-84). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. Free Press.
Scheler, M. (1973). Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, M. Frings y R. Funk (Trads.). Northwestern University Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are There Universal Aspects in the Content and Structure of Values? Journal of Social Issues, 50(4), 19-45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x
Suszko, R. (1977). The Fregean Axiom and Polish Mathematical Logic in the 1920s. Studia Logica, 36(4), 373-380.
Velleman, J. D. (2013). Foundations for Moral Relativism. Open Book Publishers.
Wójcicki, R. (1970). Some Remarks on the Consequence Operation in Sentential Logics. Fundamenta Mathematicae, 68(3), 269-279.
How to Cite
Castro-Manzano, J.-M. (2023). Reducing Values Scales. Universitas Philosophica, 40(80), 159–169. https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.uph40-80.redv
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