Palavras-chave
problemas de agência
governo corporativo
Como Citar
Resumo
Neste artigo apresenta-se uma revisão compreensiva da literatura financeira ao redor dos principais estudos relacionados com as empresas familiares. A revisão feita desde a teoria de agência, enquadra a estrutura de propriedade familiar dentro dos principais problemas de agência que surgem entre gerentes e proprietários, gerentes e depositários de dívida e acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Revisam-se três décadas de artigos relacionados com as empresas familiares e publicados nas principais revistas financeiras. Este olhar à literatura evidencia um campo de pesquisa em construção, pouco explorado na América Latina, em que se faz necessário um maior contraste empírico para entender a estrutura de propriedade familiar ao redor do mundo. Ao finalizar propõe-se uma agenda de pesquisa em empresas familiares, fundamentada em temas como o desempenho financeiro, o papel dos herdeiros, a estrutura de endividamento, a composição do conselho de direção, o impacto dos custos de agência sobre o custo de capital e os benefícios privados do controle.
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