Empresas familiares: revisão da literatura desde uma perspectiva de agência
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Jun 1, 2010
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Resumo
Neste artigo apresenta-se uma revisão compreensiva da literatura financeira ao redor dos principais estudos relacionados com as empresas familiares. A revisão feita desde a teoria de agência, enquadra a estrutura de propriedade familiar dentro dos principais problemas de agência que surgem entre gerentes e proprietários, gerentes e depositários de dívida e acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Revisam-se três décadas de artigos relacionados com as empresas familiares e publicados nas principais revistas financeiras. Este olhar à literatura evidencia um campo de pesquisa em construção, pouco explorado na América Latina, em que se faz necessário um maior contraste empírico para entender a estrutura de propriedade familiar ao redor do mundo. Ao finalizar propõe-se uma agenda de pesquisa em empresas familiares, fundamentada em temas como o desempenho financeiro, o papel dos herdeiros, a estrutura de endividamento, a composição do conselho de direção, o impacto dos custos de agência sobre o custo de capital e os benefícios privados do controle.
Keywords
family businesses, agency problems, corporate governanceempresas familiares, problemas de agencia, gobierno corporativoempresas familiares, problemas de agência, governo corporativo
References
Ali, A.; Chen, T. Y. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2007). Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44 (1-2), 238-286.
Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2003a). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58 (3), 1301-1327.
Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, and firm leverage. (2003b). Journal of Law & Economics, 46 (2), 653-680.
Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2004). Board composition: balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 49 (2), 209-237.
Anderson, R.; Duru, A. and Reeb, D. (2009). Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 92 (2), 205-222.
Anderson, R.; Mansi, S. and Reeb, D. (2003). Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68 (2), 263-285.
Andres, C. (2008). Large shareholders and firm performance: an empirical examination of founding-family ownership. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 14 (4), 431-445.
Ang, J.; Cole, R. and Lin, J. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Finance, 55 (1), 81-106.
Baek, J.-S.; Kang, J.-K. and Suh Park, K. (2004). Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 71 (2), 265-313.
Barclay, M. and Holderness, C. (1989). Private benefits from control of public corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 25 (2), 371-395.
Barontini, R. and Caprio, L. (2006). The effect of family control on firm value and performance: evidence from continental Europe. European Financial Management, 12 (5), 689-723.
Barth, E.; Gulbrandsen, T. and Schøne, P. (2005). Family ownership and productivity: the role of owner-management. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 11 (1-2), 107-127.
Basu, N.; Dimitrova, L. and Paeglis, I. (2009). Family control and dilution in mergers, Journal of Banking & Finance, 33 (5), 829-841.
Bennedsen, M.; Meisner Nielsen, K.; Perez-Gonzalez, F. and Wolfenzon, D. (2007). Inside the family firm: the role of families in succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 20 (2), 647-691.
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: The Macmillan Company. [Reprint (1991), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N. J.]
Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (2), 73-96.
Bertrand, M.; Johnson, S.; Samphantharak, K. and Schoar, A. (2008). Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them. Journal of Financial Economics, 88 (3), 466-498.
Burkart, M.; Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A. (2003). Family firms. Journal of Finance, 58 (5), 2167-2202.
Chrisman, J.; Chua, J. and Litz, R. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms: conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, 28 (4), 335-354.
Claessens, S.; Djankov, S. and Lang, L. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (1-2), 81-112.
Claessens, S.; Djankov, S.; Fan, J. and Lang, L. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57 (6), 2741-2771.
Colli, A. and Rose, M. (2003). Family firms in a comparative perspective. En F. Amatori and G. Jones (Eds.), Business history around the world (pp. 339-352). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cronqvist, H. and Nilsson, M. (2003). Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (4), 695-719.
The choice between rights offerings and private equity placements. (2005). Journal of Financial Economics, 78 (2), 275-407.
Cucculelli, M. y Micucci, G. (2008). Family succession and firm performance: Evidence from Italian family firms. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 14 (1), 17-31.
DeAngelo, H. and DeAngelo, L. (1985). Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial Economics, 14 (1), 33-69.
Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company. (2000). Journal of Financial Economics, 56 (2), 153-207.
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177.
Denis, D.; Denis, D. and Sarin, A. (1997). Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification. Journal of Finance, 52, 135-160.
Faccio, M. and Lang, L. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65 (3), 365-395.
Young, L. (2001). Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, (91), 54-78.
Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44 (2), 439-466.
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983a). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325.
Agency problems and residual claims. (1983b). Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (2), 327-349.
Gallo, M. and Vilaseca, A. (2004). Finance in family business. Family Business Review, 9 (4), 387-401.
Gomes, A. (2000). Going public without governance: managerial reputation effects. Journal of Finance, 55 (2), 615-646.
González, M.; Guzmán, A. and Trujillo, M. A. (2010). The role of heirs in family businesses: The case of Carvajal. Innovar Journal, 20 (36), en impresión.
Hauser, S. and Lauterbach, B. (2004). The value of voting rights to majority shareholders: evidence from dual-class stock unifications. The Review of Financial Studies, 17 (4), 1167-1184.
James, H. (1999). Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International Journal of Economics of Business, 6 (1), 41-55.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), 305-360.
Johnson, S.; La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. The American Economic Review, 90 (2), 22-27.
Kim, W. S. and Sorensen, E. (1986). Evidence on the impact of the agency costs of debt on corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21 (2), 131-144.
King, M. and Santor, E. (2008). Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital structure of Canadian firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32 (11), 2423-2432.
Klein, P.; Shapiro, D. and Young, J. (2005). Corporate governance, family ownership and firm value: the Canadian evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13 (6), 769-784.
La Porta, R.; López de Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54 (2), 471-517.
Machuga, S. and Teitel, K. (2009). Board of director characteristics and earnings quality surrounding implementation of a corporate governance code in Mexico. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 18 (1), 1-13.
Martikainen, M.; Nikkinen, J. and Vähämaa, S. (2009). Production functions and productivity of family firms: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49 (2), 295-307.
Matthews, C.; Vasudevan, D.; Barton, S. and Apana, R. (2004). Capital structure decision making in privately held firms: Beyond the finance paradigm. Family Business Review, 7 (4), 349-367.
Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (2), 321-341.
McConaughy, D.; Walker, M.; Henderson, G. and Mishra, C. (1998). Founding family controlled firms: Efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics, 7 (1), 1-19.
Miller, D.; Le Breton-Miller, I.; Lester, R. and Cannella Jr., A. (2007). Are family firms really superior performers? The Journal of Corporate Finance, 13 (5), 829-858.
Morck, R.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
Myers, S. (1977). The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-176.
Pérez-González, F. (2006). Inherited control and firm performance. The American Economic Review, 96 (5), 1559-1588.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. The Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3), 461-488.
A survey of corporate governance. (1997). The Journal of Finance, 52 (2), 737-783.
Smith, B. and Amoako-Adu, B. (1999). Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firms. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 5 (4), 341-368.
Sraer, D. and Thesmar, D. (2007). Performance and behavior of family firms: evidence from the French stock market. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (4), 709-751.
Stein, J. (1988). Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1), 61-80.
Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: a model of myopic corporate behavior. (1989). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (4), 655-669.
Tufano, P. (1996). Who manages risk?: An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining industry. Journal of Finance, 51 (4), 1097-1137.
Ugurlu, M. (2000). Agency costs and corporate control devices in the Turkish manufacturing industry. Journal of Economic Studies, 27 (6), 566-600.
Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80 (2), 385-417.
How are U.S. family firms controlled? (2009). Review of Financial Studies, 22 (8), 3047-3091.
Volpin, P. (2002). Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy. Journal of Financial Economics, 64 (1), 61-90.
Wiwattanakantang, Y. (1999). An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 7, 371-403.
Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2003a). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58 (3), 1301-1327.
Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, and firm leverage. (2003b). Journal of Law & Economics, 46 (2), 653-680.
Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. (2004). Board composition: balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 49 (2), 209-237.
Anderson, R.; Duru, A. and Reeb, D. (2009). Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 92 (2), 205-222.
Anderson, R.; Mansi, S. and Reeb, D. (2003). Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68 (2), 263-285.
Andres, C. (2008). Large shareholders and firm performance: an empirical examination of founding-family ownership. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 14 (4), 431-445.
Ang, J.; Cole, R. and Lin, J. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Finance, 55 (1), 81-106.
Baek, J.-S.; Kang, J.-K. and Suh Park, K. (2004). Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 71 (2), 265-313.
Barclay, M. and Holderness, C. (1989). Private benefits from control of public corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 25 (2), 371-395.
Barontini, R. and Caprio, L. (2006). The effect of family control on firm value and performance: evidence from continental Europe. European Financial Management, 12 (5), 689-723.
Barth, E.; Gulbrandsen, T. and Schøne, P. (2005). Family ownership and productivity: the role of owner-management. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 11 (1-2), 107-127.
Basu, N.; Dimitrova, L. and Paeglis, I. (2009). Family control and dilution in mergers, Journal of Banking & Finance, 33 (5), 829-841.
Bennedsen, M.; Meisner Nielsen, K.; Perez-Gonzalez, F. and Wolfenzon, D. (2007). Inside the family firm: the role of families in succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 20 (2), 647-691.
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: The Macmillan Company. [Reprint (1991), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N. J.]
Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (2), 73-96.
Bertrand, M.; Johnson, S.; Samphantharak, K. and Schoar, A. (2008). Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them. Journal of Financial Economics, 88 (3), 466-498.
Burkart, M.; Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A. (2003). Family firms. Journal of Finance, 58 (5), 2167-2202.
Chrisman, J.; Chua, J. and Litz, R. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms: conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, 28 (4), 335-354.
Claessens, S.; Djankov, S. and Lang, L. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (1-2), 81-112.
Claessens, S.; Djankov, S.; Fan, J. and Lang, L. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57 (6), 2741-2771.
Colli, A. and Rose, M. (2003). Family firms in a comparative perspective. En F. Amatori and G. Jones (Eds.), Business history around the world (pp. 339-352). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cronqvist, H. and Nilsson, M. (2003). Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (4), 695-719.
The choice between rights offerings and private equity placements. (2005). Journal of Financial Economics, 78 (2), 275-407.
Cucculelli, M. y Micucci, G. (2008). Family succession and firm performance: Evidence from Italian family firms. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 14 (1), 17-31.
DeAngelo, H. and DeAngelo, L. (1985). Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial Economics, 14 (1), 33-69.
Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company. (2000). Journal of Financial Economics, 56 (2), 153-207.
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177.
Denis, D.; Denis, D. and Sarin, A. (1997). Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification. Journal of Finance, 52, 135-160.
Faccio, M. and Lang, L. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65 (3), 365-395.
Young, L. (2001). Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, (91), 54-78.
Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44 (2), 439-466.
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983a). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325.
Agency problems and residual claims. (1983b). Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (2), 327-349.
Gallo, M. and Vilaseca, A. (2004). Finance in family business. Family Business Review, 9 (4), 387-401.
Gomes, A. (2000). Going public without governance: managerial reputation effects. Journal of Finance, 55 (2), 615-646.
González, M.; Guzmán, A. and Trujillo, M. A. (2010). The role of heirs in family businesses: The case of Carvajal. Innovar Journal, 20 (36), en impresión.
Hauser, S. and Lauterbach, B. (2004). The value of voting rights to majority shareholders: evidence from dual-class stock unifications. The Review of Financial Studies, 17 (4), 1167-1184.
James, H. (1999). Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International Journal of Economics of Business, 6 (1), 41-55.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), 305-360.
Johnson, S.; La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. The American Economic Review, 90 (2), 22-27.
Kim, W. S. and Sorensen, E. (1986). Evidence on the impact of the agency costs of debt on corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21 (2), 131-144.
King, M. and Santor, E. (2008). Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital structure of Canadian firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32 (11), 2423-2432.
Klein, P.; Shapiro, D. and Young, J. (2005). Corporate governance, family ownership and firm value: the Canadian evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13 (6), 769-784.
La Porta, R.; López de Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54 (2), 471-517.
Machuga, S. and Teitel, K. (2009). Board of director characteristics and earnings quality surrounding implementation of a corporate governance code in Mexico. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 18 (1), 1-13.
Martikainen, M.; Nikkinen, J. and Vähämaa, S. (2009). Production functions and productivity of family firms: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49 (2), 295-307.
Matthews, C.; Vasudevan, D.; Barton, S. and Apana, R. (2004). Capital structure decision making in privately held firms: Beyond the finance paradigm. Family Business Review, 7 (4), 349-367.
Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (2), 321-341.
McConaughy, D.; Walker, M.; Henderson, G. and Mishra, C. (1998). Founding family controlled firms: Efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics, 7 (1), 1-19.
Miller, D.; Le Breton-Miller, I.; Lester, R. and Cannella Jr., A. (2007). Are family firms really superior performers? The Journal of Corporate Finance, 13 (5), 829-858.
Morck, R.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
Myers, S. (1977). The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-176.
Pérez-González, F. (2006). Inherited control and firm performance. The American Economic Review, 96 (5), 1559-1588.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. The Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3), 461-488.
A survey of corporate governance. (1997). The Journal of Finance, 52 (2), 737-783.
Smith, B. and Amoako-Adu, B. (1999). Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firms. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 5 (4), 341-368.
Sraer, D. and Thesmar, D. (2007). Performance and behavior of family firms: evidence from the French stock market. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (4), 709-751.
Stein, J. (1988). Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1), 61-80.
Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: a model of myopic corporate behavior. (1989). Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (4), 655-669.
Tufano, P. (1996). Who manages risk?: An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining industry. Journal of Finance, 51 (4), 1097-1137.
Ugurlu, M. (2000). Agency costs and corporate control devices in the Turkish manufacturing industry. Journal of Economic Studies, 27 (6), 566-600.
Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80 (2), 385-417.
How are U.S. family firms controlled? (2009). Review of Financial Studies, 22 (8), 3047-3091.
Volpin, P. (2002). Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy. Journal of Financial Economics, 64 (1), 61-90.
Wiwattanakantang, Y. (1999). An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 7, 371-403.
Como Citar
González Ferrero, M., Gúzman Vásquez, A., Pombo Bejarano, C., & Trujillo Dávila, M. A. (2010). Empresas familiares: revisão da literatura desde uma perspectiva de agência. Cuadernos De Administración, 23(40). https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.cao23-40.efrl
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