There are different points of view from which legal reasoning can be examined. Some argue that there is a correct theory of legal reasoning and therefore, they analyze particular cases in order to determine if a particular argument drawn by a judge or a court is coherent with a proposed theory. One of the main assets of Critical Legal Studies (gv) is to think about law as a practice in which there is no need to establish a particular theory to grasp reality. In the area of legal reasoning, Dxgex Kixxih has tried to show us how the main concern of a judge is about legitimacy, even though in a particular case he will try to reach a decision that expresses a political project of his own. In this article I will try to show how the Kennedy's approach about the way a judge develops her legal reasoning, fairly describes some practices of the Constitutional Court. gv can show us a path in which criticism towards legal reasoning can be more effective. I affirm that one of the criticisms against the Constitutional Court has tried to show how she is or is not coherent with a theory of legal reasoning that she may not share. This is a non-productive way to run criticism. In their writings of legal reasoning, gv show a path for a more productive criticism than the one that has been made in Colombia so far.